Posted by
Street Carnage
• 02.24.17 05:53 pm


Does it really matter if there are some thirteen year-olds who wouldn’t mind boning an adult? There’s no excuse for an adult to have sex with a fucking child. Milo recently got himself into a boatload of trouble for discussing this with a bunch of nerds and Gavin talks about it in his article.

  1. Out of the Mainstream says:

    There has to be another LGBT that the conservatives can glom onto. Maybe Caty Jenner can get all catty and political.

  2. Donkey Puncherelo says:

    You mean Bruce?

  3. Colonel Klink says:

    Hopefully Trump puts this nonce in a work camp. #MAGA

  4. Ben Frankly says:

    It was a good article by the “straight” journalist Gavin. The problem wasn’t Yonobbilous was being an outre law professor in the Advanced Paedofeelya 317 semenar, it was more of a Lifetime Swine Award. Like an icky Icarus he flew too close to the sun. Back to the kitchen with your bitchin’, Yamulkecluss.. I know, that “Milo” was a famed Graeco-Roman wrestler in Aristotle’s day; Plato himself liked wrassling with the cub scouts as Chicagoan Alan Bloom could tell you; but don’t trust Ann Coulter on this point, go with NBC newsman Al Sharpton who’s right twice a day on the “Greek homos” question as regards these queer-ass folk heroes of The MTV Right. The tag team of Adam and Steve were IIRC of no use in defeating communism and even still persist to be very unfair to the President and are not treating him nicely, as he has treated them. The gay Republican fusion movement is officially now a hot mess! Incidentally if you have some spare time ask a libertarian cosplayer his opinions on the legal status of animated child pr0n– the gears and springs will shoot out like C3PO on PCP

  5. Wizardly Wheeze says:

    He was talking absolute nonce-sense.

  6. dsafafdsa says:

    Funniest thing about Gavin:

    Swears up and down he’s not a racist or anti-semite (aka Nazi), but if shit went down on the street there’s no way he’d be able to align himself with liberals. He’d be all “fuck it, you want a Nazi!? Then fine! I hate liberals so much I’m OK with being associated with Nazis!”

  7. Milo went to College says:

    Milo is his generation’s Michael Savage. Who is generation’s Morton Downey Jr. Who was his generation’s Lenny Bruce. Marginally talented guys who found a niche being ever more edgy, ever more outrageous until they went just a bit off the rails and crashed.

    It’s liking watching Marylin Manson do Alice Cooper or Lady Gaga do Madonna. Nothing really new to see here.

  8. OogaBooga says:

    Meanwhile George Takei is sassier and more beloved than ever in his efforts to push an “American Spring,” and the works of NAMBLA faggot Allen Ginsberg are still revered in the hallowed halls of cultural marxist occupied academia.

  9. Stabby says:

    You made out with a gay male pedophile. The squaw and your mixed-race kids must be so proud, you fucking faggot Gavin. And Ooga, I’m gonna push you onto the ground HARD when I find you.

  10. Stabby says:

    Oh, and Ooga- if I see you in a store I’m gonna push you into a display. You’re FUCKED. I know your dentist too, and he’s not gonna be so gentle next time. If I see you with work clothes on, I’m gonna lay a piece of pizza face down on your FUCKING SHIRT!

  11. Stabby says:

    Ooga– watch where you walk- I’m laying down rakes all around your neighborhood. You’re gonna step on one and get it RIGHT IN THE FACE YOU FAT FUCK! I hope your friends like EGGS, Douche-Tard! I’m gonna throw one at them!

  12. Stabby says:

    Better learn to like the taste of soap and fucking tree bark you FAGGOT OOGA, cuz that all you’ll be eating soon, you FUCK TARD!

  13. Stabby says:

    GAVIN- guess who’s throwing out all of your treasured “punk-rock” memerobelia in the trash? ME YOU FUCKING GAYLORD!

  14. Stabby says:


  15. Stabby says:


  16. Stabby says:


  17. Donkey Puncherelo says:

    Rakes, eggs, tree bark, oh my! Basically beyond that, all I got was bicurious and daddy issues. If you’re black Milo might be interested.

  18. Donkey Puncherelo says:

    Ooga, you seriously need to watch out since you might get pushed down and have a slice of pizza thrown at you nice clothes. Also, this Gavin guy might have some of his property thrown away. I am calling 911 right now.

  19. The REAL Oooga Booga says:

    Poor, poor, fella. He missing “daddy” after all these years..
    I would hold him softly and sing this sweet little song.
    C’mon everybody, sing it with me , right now, You all remember the tune!
    The love between the two of us was dying
    And it got so bad I knew I had to leave
    But halfway down that highway when I turned around I saw
    My little boy running after me
    Daddy, don’t you walk so fast
    Daddy, don’t you walk so fast
    Daddy, slow down some ’cause you’re makin’ me cum
    Daddy, don’t you walk so fast
    Now, it broke my heart to tell my little boy
    That his daddy had to run to catch a train
    He had no way of knowin’ I was leavin’ home for good
    I turned around and there he was again
    As he said to me
    Daddy, don’t you walk so fast
    Daddy, don’t you walk so fast
    Daddy, slow down some ’cause you’re makin’ me cum
    If only for the sake of my sweet boy
    I just had to turn back home right there and then
    And try…

  20. OogaBooga says:

    Big NAMBLA fan, eh, Stabby?

  21. OogaBooga says:

    Do not fuck with my loafers, stabby. I’m not fucking around.

  22. imyar says:

    Damn daniel.

  23. Stubby Pencil says:

    Sometimes a thing may be so
    Even if The Media vouch it true;
    In moonlight those black boys
    Do look fabulously blue

    If “ifs” and “buts”
    Were candied nuts
    My Longfellow would be
    Extension of Warren Beatty
    But into disillusion we’re led
    Like the “Deliverance” scene w/ Ned
    Still I found it quite educational,

    -Milo Y., grade 5

  24. Chew Chew Chew for Good Digestion says:

    I proposes to radicalise critique… by collapsing the hierarchy of the transcendental and the empirical… the first thing that needs to be destratified is the empirical/transcendental difference. Kant’s critique of metaphysics is conducted precisely by means of distinguishing the transcendental from the empirical (and also the transcendental from the transcendent). Deleuze and, a fortiriori, Land turn this critique back upon its presuppositions, in order to affirm a radical immanence, in which “matter itself is synthetic and productive. Matter is primary process, and everything that unfolds at the level of conceptual representation is merely secondary and derivative.” Deleuze already pursues this via Bergson’s critique of representation and privileging of intuition. Land goes further, getting rid of intuition, and of anything else that is subjective, phenomenological, or affective. Land values intensity in itself, apart from any of these frameworks; the “subject” cannot experience intensity, because intensity destabilises and eliminates it. Brassier applauds this move, in contrast to the “flaccid inanity of contemporary Bergsonian vitalism,” which Brassier clearly detests.

    However, this move also gets Land into an impossible impasse; this is because

    vitalism is hence all about having intense experiences. But Landianism can’t avail itself of this register of intensification, because he’s not interested in phenomenological subjectivity and he’s not interested in experiences insofar as they are experiences of a subject in the Deleuzoguattarian register: an organism, with a face and a personal identity, etc. These are all the things that are supposed to require destratification.
    In other words, the project fails precisely because intensification is “not translatable into any register of affective experience or affective intensity” — in exactly the same way that it is not translatable into any register of cognition or conceptualization. Those of us working in affect theory have been claiming for quite some time that the realm of affect is presubjective, and that it includes layers of efficacy and determination that are irreducible to cognition or to concepts. (My own version of this works this out by ignoring Kant’s transcendental argument in the First Critique, in favor of his aesthetics in the Third Critique). Brassier tells us that we are operating with a stacked deck, as it were; all our arguments about the failure of cognition or of concepts can be turned around to equally demonstrate the failure of “affective experience or affective intensity.” From Brassier’s point of view, we are all a bit “muddle-headed” (as Russell accused Whitehead of being). In Brassier’s account, the superiority of Land is that he at least faces the deep consequences of an ethics of intensity, as Deleuze and affect theorists do not.

    But the other side of this is that, according to Brassier, Land has no other basis for action besides the one that he has so rigorously destroyed. Land wants to maintain “that you can just keep on intensifying and intensifying,” without end. This is impressive in that it substitutes a death drive, Thanatos, for the vitalist (Bergsonian) life drive that Brassier finds so lax and vapid. But ultimately Land’s process of radicalization subverts itself: “if your schizoanalytical practice is fuelled by the need to always intensify and deterritorialize, there comes a point at which there is no agency left: you yourself have been dissolved back into the process.” Inevitably “you end up engendering performative contradictions, not just theoretical ones. Contradictions at the level of concepts manifest themselves as an incapacity at the level of practice.” Or, in other words, Land’s philosophy “leads to a kind of practical impotence.”

    From this, the route to Land’s current politics is easy to see. For Land, “politics must be displaced, it must be deputized, and all you can do is endorse or affirm impersonal processes which at least harbour the promise of generating or ushering in the next phase of deterritorialization.” You can only be fatalistic, welcoming the processes that destroy us as agents or subjects. But in practice, your disavowal of any willed practice “means affirming free markets, deregulation, the capitalist desecration of traditional forms of social organization, etc…. If you have no strategy, someone with a strategy will soon commandeer your tactics.” Land ends up becoming “he pawn of another kind of impersonal force… a much more cynical kind of libertarian capitalism.” Celebrating capitalist deterritorialization for its own sake leads to neo-reaction, or neo-feudalism, or whatever else we want to call the emerging politics of Silicon Valley. Trump may be losing the ability to govern, but (as Junior Metaballs suggests), a Trump 2.0 is likely to emerge in the near future, one much more capable than Trump who is clearly headed towards failure.

  25. Chew Chew Chew for Good Digestion Part 2 says:

    Brassier’s own answer to this dilemma consists in his turn toward Sellars and allied philosophers; it’s a sort of Kant 2.0 that rehabilitates epistemology, rationality, and scientism from Deleuzian and Landian critiques. But I am not going to go into my own critique of Brassier’s position in any direct way here; rather, I want to suggest the possibility of a third position, distinct from either Brassier or Land, but nonetheless subsisting within the (anti-vitalist) terrain that Brassier depicts.

    In short: Brassier warns us that “once thinking itself becomes subordinated to the imperative to intensify and destratify,” — and thereby rejects representation and epistemological issues– then “it’s clear that there must be a limitrophic point of absolute deterritorialization towards which the process of affirmation or acceleration tends.” But why should thought be governed by “the imperative to intensify and destratify,” any more than by the more traditional philosophic imperative of self-reflexive epistemological and representational critique? I am inclined to think that these are two sides of the same coin. Why should we do either?

    My own response here is an aesthetic one. I am inclined to think (as I already argue in my book Discognition) that — far from being a discrediting flaw — performative contradiction is actually a sign that something is going right. Or — to put it a bit less categorically — arguments that end in performative contradiction are of course not necessarily right; but any line of approach that is right must necessarily lead to some sort of performative contradiction. This is because of the necessary inadequacy of cognitive categories to grasp and determine the Real. It’s a lesson we ultimately get from Kant, in spite of himself, and that becomes more overt in post-Kantians like Derrida (I know he usually isn’t regarded this way, but he should be), and in today’s speculative realism. This is where we get the philosophical destratification of the transcendental-empirical binary. All of our transcendental a prioris (and we cannot ever dispense with them) turn out to be empirical and contingent in the last analysis. The very act of making a categorical assertion involves me in a performative contradiction; yet we cannot do without such categorical assertions. You can well say, from the point of view of epistemology, that this situation “leads to a kind of practical impotence,” or to an endless process of deconstruction. But performative contradiction is an aesthetic condition, not an epistemological one. Art exists because the most important things in life are epistemologically intractable. Epistemology (the First Critique) and ethics (the Second Critique) are incomplete, and indeed they can only avoid collapse, through the intervention of aesthetics (the Third Critique).

    I think that (as I argued in a different way in my little book on accelerationism) any such neo-aestheticism also implies a different theory of desire from the one we take for granted. Affirmationist and vitalist theory, and the radical negation of these that we find in its most “virulent” form in Land, and in a much more sophisticated form in Brassier, are united in that they both assume the infinitude of desire, and hence the inevitable discontinuity between desire (or desiring production) and its actual effects or consequences. Such is also the presupposition of the 19th and 20th century sublime, of psychoanalytic theories of desire, and of the simple consumerism which is our most elaborated form of desire today. Against this widely-shared idea of desire’s infinitude, what I am calling neo-aestheticism understands desire as being finite, multiple, and combinatorial. Such an approach to desire is expressed most fully perhaps, in Charles Fourier’s utopian visions (which are simultaneously a parody of bourgeois-capitalist forms of subjectivity, and their antidote), as well as in the notions of self-fashioning that we see, perhaps, in Oscar Wilde and Andy Warhol. Aesthetic self-fashioning does not start in any thing subjective or agential; instead, it ends in them (and of course it only ends in this way provisionally, because as finite and combinatorial it always runs out at some point, and hence needs to be practised again. This incompletion is what is often misunderstood as the infinitude of desire; but it involves repeated small satisfactions, rather than some general existential dissatisfaction).

  26. The advice is very exciting.

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